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1. Introduction 
 
The role that public infrastructure investment can play in increasing private sector 
productivity is a burgeoning area of research. Although there have been many studies 
which look at this issue (See Aschauer (1988, 1989a, 1989b), Berndt and Hansson 
(1981), Nadiri and Mamuneas (1991), Alesina et al. (1991), Dixon and McDonald 
(1991)), these studies often do not take into account the public (or semi-public) nature 
of infrastructure goods such as a transport network. In this paper we look at a transport 
network as a kind of congested or semi-public good, and derive estimates of a 
‘congestion index’ which can help to determine not only an optimal tax to ration 
demand to capacity in the short run, but also to provide a signal as to the optimal 
amount of investment to be put into the transport network. 
 
In the traditional literature on transport congestion (Walters, 1961; Mohring and 
Harwitz, 1962), the concept of infrastructure capacity is often defined in terms of the 
maximum level of traffic flow, which is more of a usage concept rather than a ‘capacity’ 
concept. Congestion is then defined in terms of an increase in the marginal social cost of 
this traffic flow over and above the marginal private costs (measured in terms of the 
average travel time per trip distance). While this is a useful definition, it does not give 
adequate recognition to the fact that ‘congestion’ is truly a phenomenon relating to 
transport capacity rather than transport usage as such, and capacity (or capacity 
utilisation level) is perhaps more precisely and unambiguously defined in terms of the 
traffic density level rather than traffic flow. In this paper, we explore this alternative 
definition of transport infrastructure ‘capacity’ and use this concept to examine the issue 
of investment in transport infrastructure to relieve ‘congestion’. Capacity is defined as a 
form of public capital good, and ‘congestion’ refers to the situation when the utilisation 
of this public good becomes partly ‘rival’. Congestion results in the actual level of 
utilisation of the system ‘capacity’ by each user being less than the full maximum 
potential because of the rivalness in consumption of a semi-public good. Utilisation of 
system capacity can be measured in terms of the actual speed achievable by each user1. 
Since the change in capacity utilisation rate can come about either from a change in the 
level of demand for travel (trip level) and/or an increase in the system capacity, we 
distinguish between two different situations: a ‘short run’ situation where an ‘optimal 
congestion tax’ can be used to ‘regulate’ demand to a given level of system capacity, 
and a ‘long-run’ situation, when the issue is an investment in long run capacity to meet 
with any projected long run demand. We illustrate this with an empirical calculation for 
an actual road network. 
                                                          
1 We note that speed is uniquely related to traffic density given any particular physical characteristics of 
the transport system, but since traffic flow = traffic density*speed, there can be two different levels of 
traffic flow corresponding to the same level of traffic speed: one with a high density level (high 
congestion), and one with a low density level (low congestion) (see Walters (1961), Lindsey and Verhoef 
(2000)). Flow is thus an ambiguous characterisation of system capacity or capacity utilisation and 
therefore, an ambiguous measure of ‘congestion’, as compared to either density or speed. 
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2. Public Infrastructure as a Congested Public Good 
 
Let G be the stock or capacity of a public infrastructure asset available for use and Gi be 
the ‘effective’ level of utilisation of this capacity by user i. If G is a pure public good, 
then by definition: 
 
niGGi ,...,1, ==         (1)  
 
where n is the total number of users (that is, every user has unimpeded equal access). 
On the other hand, if G is a pure private good, then we have instead: 
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In the general case when G is an impure (partially congested) public good, we have: 
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As Oakland (1987) pointed out, congested public goods can be treated as though 
equivalent to a combination of congestion externalities and a pure public good which 
relates to total system capacity. Thus, if f i(.) stands for the production function of user 
i, then we have: 
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where Li and Ki stand for the private (labour, capital) inputs, Gj is the effective level of 
utilisation of public infrastructure by user j, and G is the total system capacity. We can 
imagine f i(.) as representing, for example, the utility of a final activity (work, or leisure 
activity) by a traveller i, who uses a road network to produce a travelling input into this 
activity. The effective travelling input can be defined as ti = ti(Gi, G, ki, li), where (ki, li) 
are some part of the total (Ki, Li). For example, (ki) can represent a ‘car’, (li) the driving 
time by user i and given any level of (ki), we can define ti/li = Gi/G, i.e. the ‘effective 
travel time input’ into the final activity is related, not only to the actual travel time li, 
but also to the ‘effective level of utilisation of road capacity’ (Gi/G). This is because if, 
for example, there is congestion and it takes 20 minutes to cross a particular segment of 
the road which would normally take only 10 minutes, then we have: li = 20, ti = 10, and 
ti/li = Gi/G  = 0.5. The effective level of road capacity utilisation in this case is thus 
only 0.5 or 50%, and this is due the presence of congestion, which increases a ‘normal’ 
travel time from 10 minutes (effective level of travel time input) to 20 minutes (actual 
travel time). The ratio of effective level of road capacity utilisation can be measured by 
observing the ratio of the actual speed (Gi) over the free-flow speed (G). Speed (or its 
inverse, travel time) can thus be seen as an effective measure of system ‘capacity’ (or 
capacity utilisation level).  
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There are also other important reasons why we define ‘capacity’ G and capacity 
utilisation level Gi in terms of speed rather than in terms of ‘flow’ or in terms of the 
physical characteristics of the road network, as will be explained in more details in a 
later section. For the present, however, it is sufficient to say that, as far as each 
individual traveller i’s activity is concerned, the maximum flow or the physical 
characteristics of the road are ‘relevant’ to this individual activity only in so far as they 
have an impact on the ultimate speed at which each individual user i can travel at, i.e. on 
Gi 2. We have: 
 
jiGfGf j
i
i
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which says that j ' s  utilisation of the system capacity would contribute to congestion and 
therefore would impact negatively on user i ' s  system capacity utilisation level and 
hence on her marginal utility (or productivity). An alternative specification for a 
congested public good is to assume that each effective utilisation of the good is given by 
the user's own utilisation rate and an overall level of congestion θ: 
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We refer to equation (7) as the congestion function. Pareto optimal allocation of 
resources in the case of a congested public good can now be found by solving the 
following optimisation problem: 
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where X j  is the output or utility level associated with user j, and F(.) is the 
transformation function between total private capital (∑
=
n
i
iK
1
) and total public capital 
goods. The rate of transformation between these two types of goods will measure the 
shadow price of public capital for the economy as a whole (or transport network in 
particular). 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 In other words, an individual traveller is not so much concerned about how many vehicles there are 
travelling on the same road, or how many traffic lanes or how wide these traffic lanes are, but rather on 
how fast she can travel, given a particular driving behaviour and safety standard, etc. 
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The Lagrangian for this optimisation problem is: 
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with λi = −1 and Xi = 0 for the reference i. The efficiency conditions with respect to Gi 
are as follows (assuming that Gi < G, and therefore αi = 0 for all i). 
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Equations (10) and (11) can be combined to give: 
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and equations (10) and (12) can be combined to give: 
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Equations (14) and (15) can also be combined to give: 
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If increasing the aggregate utilisation rate and capacity by the same proportion would 
leave congestion unchanged (i.e. the function θ(.) is homogeneous of degree zero in its 
arguments)3, then we have: 
 
                                                          
3 This implies constant returns to scale in the consumption (or utilisation) of capacity (taken into account 
at a particular level of congestion θ), but not necessarily in its production. 
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Multiplying (16) by Gi and summing over all i’s using (17), we have: 
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where PG = (FG/FP) is the shadow price of public capital in terms of private capital 
foregone. 
 
Equation (18) is a special case of the Samuelson condition for the optimal provision of a 
congested public good4. The ratio )/( iK
i
G ii
ff  stands for the marginal productivity of a 
public capital good relative to that of a private capital good for user i. If we adopt the 
benefit principle of taxation then each individual user should be charged an 
individualised (or Lindahl) price for the effective utilisation of public infrastructure as 
follows: 
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where iGP  is the per unit price for public infrastructure capacity G and 
i
GT  is the total 
contribution from user i towards the total public infrastructure capacity costs5. Using 
(16), we have: 
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3. Application to a Transport Network 
 
To operationalise the model, we need an empirical specification of the congestion 
function (7). One specification of this function is the form used in many public 
infrastructure studies such as the one proposed by Shah (1992): 
 
θ).( ii IGG =          (21)  
 
Here, Ii <1 stands for an ‘index of use’ (of the road capacity) by user i, and θ is a 
‘parameter indicating the degree of publicness of public infrastructure’6. In the case of a 
road network, θ can be used to indicate the ‘degree of congestion’ on the road7. 
                                                          
4 See Oakland (1987, p. 501). 
5 In practice when a price is charged for the use of a public infrastructure, this would consist of both a 
'usage' component to cover the short run operating and maintenance costs and a 'capacity' (or capital) 
component to cover the rental price of infrastructure capital. Here we are concerned only with the 
capacity component. 
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To define the index of use, first, we assume that there is a minimum level of traffic 
density n0 at which (or below this level), the infrastructure remains a pure public good. 
When the infrastructure is a pure public good, the index of use by each user should be 
equal to 1 (i.e. 100 percent utilisation rate): Ii =1 for n ≤ n0. Next, when traffic density 
exceeds this minimum level, n > n0, the ratio (n0/n) can now be used to indicate the 
‘relative index of use’. Since the infrastructure is now a semi-public or ‘congested’ 
public good, each user’s rate of utilisation of the good should be less than 1, and sum up 
to the same level as when there were only n0 users, i.e. Ii = (n0/n) < 1 for n > n0.  
 
Capacity utilisation level Gi (or the utilisation index Gi/G) can also be defined as 
follows. Given any traffic density level n and with an average speed si achievable by 
each user at that density, the average traffic flow will be nsi. Comparing this with the 
potential maximum traffic flow of nsmax achievable if capacity utilisation is 100 percent, 
i.e. when the speed achievable is a maximum at this density8 by all users, we can define 
the ‘capacity utilisation ratio’ (Gi/G) as being equal simply to this ratio of actual traffic 
flow over the potential maximum flows. We have (Gi/G) = nsi/nsmax = si/smax. From this, 
it can be seen that capacity utilisation ratio can be indicated by ratio of the actual speed 
over the maximum potential speed9, given any level of traffic density.  
 
Equation (21) can now be interpreted as follows:  
• If there is no congestion (θ = 0), then (Gi/G) = (si/smax) = 1, i.e. every 
vehicle can travel at the potential maximum speed. 
• When there is some congestion on the road (θ  > 0), capacity utilisation 
ratio (and hence speed ratio) will depend on the index of use (relative 
traffic density n/n0) as well as the degree of congestion10. With Ii = (n0/n)<1 
and θ > 1, (Gi/G) = (n0/n)θ <1, which gives: (n0/n)G ≤ Gi ≤ G for (0 ≤ θ ≤ 
1), as is required by equation (3). 
• When θ = 1, Gi = (n0/n)G and si = (n0/n)smax. This can be referred to as a 
situation when ‘public’ infrastructure good has become a completely rival 
or pure ‘private’ good. At this point, the actual traffic flow nsi reaches the 
maximum level n0smax, which is defined in the traditional literature as the 
maximum ‘capacity’ of the road. When θ = 1, any percentage increase (or 
decrease) in traffic density will be matched by an exact and opposite 
percentage decrease (or increase) in the level of speed for all vehicles11. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
6 Shah (1992, p. 29). 
7 Shah referred to θ as the degree of ‘publicness’ of the infrastructure good, but in fact, it can be seen that 
the greater the value of θ, the smaller would be the value of Gi. Hence, it would be more appropriate to 
refer to θ as the degree of non-publicness (or ‘rivalness’ in consumption) of the public infrastructure 
good, and in the case of a road network, the degree of ‘rivalness in consumption’ is in fact the degree of 
‘congestion’ in the network. 
8 Clearly, this can be achieved only if actual capacity is increased, and/or actual density is reduced, 
therefore, we refer to this flow as the maximum potential flow. 
9 The maximum potential speed is to be determined not only by the physical characteristics of the road, 
but also by traffic regulation and safety standards. 
10 In fact the degree of congestion is to be defined in accordance with the empirical relationship between 
speed (capacity utilisation) ratio and relative traffic density level. See the empirical section below. 
11 This implies the elasticity of speed with respect to traffic density (measured by the congestion index θ - 
see the section below) is now equal exactly to 1. 
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Road space has become a pure private good, and one vehicle’s 
‘consumption’ of this space must be at the full expense of another’s. 
Therefore, the rate at which road space is ‘consumed’ by all users (the 
traffic flow rate) must remain ‘constant’ at the maximum ‘capacity’ level, 
which is determined by the physical conditions of the road. 
• Finally, the case of θ > 1 and Gi < (n0/n)G (or si < (n0/n)smax) can also be 
described as a situation when ‘public’ infrastructure good has become, not 
only a pure private good, but also with significant negative externality 
arising from the use of road space by one user on all others. The negative 
externality results in the aggregate utilisation of road space by all users is 
now reduced rather than increased as a result of a marginal increase in 
traffic density. This means the resulting traffic flow will decrease and the 
travel time-traffic flow curve will become ‘backward bending’, a situation 
described in the traditional literature as one of ‘hyper-congestion’ or 
bottleneck’ congestion. 
 
From equation (21), we can now derive a formula for the congestion index. First, we 
substitute Ii = (n0/n) into equation (21), and sum over all i’s, then taking the logarithm of 
both sides and re-arranging terms, we have: 
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Using (22)-(23), we can derive: 
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Substituting this into (20), we obtain: 
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Equation (25) shows the (marginal and total) willingness-to-pay (i.e. ( iGP  and 
i
i
G
i
G GPT = ) for effective capacity utilisation Gi by each individual user i at different 
levels of congestion. We note that equilibrium condition requires that the total 
willingness-to-pay by all users to system capacity (n iGT ) must be equal to its supply 
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cost (GPG). From equation (25), we also observe that, firstly, when congestion level is 
zero (n=n0 and θ=0) and system capacity is a pure public good, all users can share this 
capacity without diminishing the level of utilisation of one another, therefore, the 
individual opportunity cost of capacity utilisation at this zero level of congestion is just 
i
GP =(PG/n)=(PG/n0), where PG is the supply price of system capacity and n=n0 is the 
actual number of users. This is the Samuelson condition for the shadow pricing of a 
public good. Next, when congestion becomes positive (n>n0, θ>0), system capacity 
becomes a congested public good, and therefore, each individual user’s effective 
utilisation of system capacity is now less than the full maximum level (Gi<G), the 
willingness-to-pay for capacity utilisation in this case is thus also less than the zero-
congestion shadow price, i.e. iGP <(PG/n0). 
 
 
4. Congestion Index as an Elasticity of Speed with 
respect to Traffic Density 
 
Substituting Ii = (n0/n) and (Gi/G) = (si/smax) into equation (21), we have: 
 
θ)/( 0max nnssi =         (26)  
 
From this, we can define the concept of ‘elasticity of speed (or capacity utilisation 
level) with respect to traffic density level’, and which is seen to be equal to just the 
congestion index θ: 
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Compare this with the traditional concept of elasticity of speed with respect to the level 
of traffic flow (see Walters, 1961, p. 694): 
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Here F = nsi is the traffic flow. We have: 
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From this, it can be seen that when θ < 1, ε > 0, and when θ → 1, ε → ∞. The 
traditional case of ε = ∞ (when traffic flow reaches the maximum level and the travel 
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time-traffic flow curve starts to become ‘backward bending’) can thus be described as a 
situation when the ‘public’ infrastructure (system capacity) has become a pure private 
good (θ = 1). The traditional analysis does not proceed beyond this point and the 
traditional concept of ‘optimal congestion tax’ (defined in terms of traffic flow level 
rather than in terms of traffic density) also does not apply beyond this point. In our case, 
however, the analysis can continue beyond this point for θ > 1 and ε < 0. This is 
because the ‘backward bending’ traffic flow curve can simply be interpreted as the case 
when system capacity has become not only a pure ‘private’ good, but also there is 
significant negative externality resulting from each individual user’s utilisation of 
system capacity on each other, such that the net result is a reduction in the overall or 
aggregate utilisation, and hence traffic flow12 level decreases. In this case, it is socially 
optimal to invest in system capacity expansion rather than in trying to reduce traffic 
demand. This point will be illustrated further below. 
 
 
5. Congestion Index as a Measure of Optimal 
Congestion Tax 
 
In the traditional analysis, optimal congestion tax is defined in terms of traffic flow 
measure. Given any particular level of traffic flow, the average social cost (of traffic 
flow) is given by the individual (i.e. private marginal) cost of travel, the latter is 
measured by the individual travel time per unit distance13. Given that this travel time is 
increasing with increasing level of traffic flow (due to congestion), the average social 
cost is thus rising with increasing level of traffic flow (before the backward bending part 
sets in). This implies the marginal social cost is also rising and is above the average 
social cost. The percentage difference between the marginal and average social cost is 
measured by the ‘elasticity of average social cost’, i.e. the elasticity of travel time, or 
the negative of the elasticity of travel speed, with respect to the traffic flow level (see 
Walters, 1961). This is the value of ε as defined by equation (28). The value of ε is then 
used to define an optimal congestion tax rate to be applied to a particular traffic flow to 
reduce it to a socially optimal level. This is the ‘traditional’ analysis. 
 
The difficulty of defining optimal congestion tax in terms of ε. (rather than in terms of 
θ) is that, firstly, it is more difficult to impose a tax on traffic flow rather than on traffic 
density. This is because traffic flow is measured over a finite interval of time, and hence 
the definition of the tax must necessarily be conditional on the definition of this finite 
interval. Secondly, traffic flow curve can become ‘backward bending’, i.e. ε becomes 
negative, and therefore, the definition of an optimal congestion ‘tax’ which becomes 
‘negative’ can be ambiguous. In contrast, if we define ‘optimal congestion tax’ in terms 
of θ rather than in terms of ε, then there is no such difficulty or ambiguity. Traffic 
volume or density is precisely and unambiguously defined at any particular point in 
time. Secondly, even when the travel time-traffic flow curve becomes backward 
bending (ε<0) the travel time-traffic density curve remains upward sloping (θ >1) and 
this value of the congestion index (or speed elasticity) θ continues to bear a particularly 
meaningful signal for useful analysis. When ε<0 and θ >1, the situation can be 
described as one where negative externality in the utilisation of system capacity has 
                                                          
12 Traffic flow represents aggregate utilisation of capacity by all users over a fixed interval of time. 
13 Assuming that travel time is the most important component of individual travel costs. 
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become significant to such an extent that the net marginal social cost of congestion is 
greater than even the marginal cost of supply of system capacity. Therefore, the value of 
the optimal congestion tax rate θ is now greater than 1, which implies society is willing 
to pay to reduce congestion, by investing in an extra unit of capacity rather than merely 
trying to reduce its utilisation rate. Investing in extra capacity can be referred to as a 
‘long run’ situation. This is in contrast to the ‘short run’ situation of merely trying to 
regulate traffic demand (traffic density). Our analysis, is thus applicable to both the long 
run situation as well as short run analysis, depending on the particular value of 
congestion index θ derived from empirical analysis. 
 
 
6. Empirical Application to an Actual Road Network 
 
We want to apply equation (21) to the empirical measurement of the level of congestion 
for an actual road network. The data we use is a sample of 3,730 road segments (or 
links) of various types in the Sydney Metropolitan Area for 200114. For each link, we 
obtained information on the link type (arterial, highway, expressway, freeway, etc.), 
link length (kms), number of lanes, vehicle density (vehicles per lane per km), travel 
time and speed, for different time periods of day (AM, Mid-day, PM) and night time 
(Nite). We have selected freeway conditions only since they relate most appropriately to 
tollroad settings, the focus of this paper. From this data we first plot the information on 
vehicle speed versus traffic density for various times of day. This is shown in Figure 1. 
From this speed-density scatter diagram, we observe that there is a definite (negative) 
relationship between the (potential)15 speed si achievable at any level of traffic density 
level n and the actual traffic density, as hypothesised earlier in equation (27). From this 
scatter diagram, we can also define the ‘maximum-capacity’ speed smax (which can be 
affected, not only by the physical characteristics of the road, but also by traffic 
regulation) and its corresponding minimum or free flow density n0. Once these 
‘reference’ values of smax and n0 are defined, the value of θ can then be calculated as a 
function of the speed ratio (si/smax) and the density ratio (n/n0) for each empirical 
observation as described by equation (27). These empirical values of θ ‘s are plotted in 
Figure 2 as a function of the density ratio (n/n0). Given the congestion index θ, the 
‘optimal congestion tax rate’ is thus also defined by θ. From Figure 2, then, it can be 
seen that if traffic density on freeway increases to a level which is about 10 times the 
‘free-flow’ density (i.e n/n0 = 10), congestion will then reach a level such that it is 
optimal to impose a tax rate of θ=0.27 or 27 percent on top of the ‘normal’ toll to 
attempt to reduce traffic density to a socially optimal level (which also corresponds to 
the situation when traffic density will eventually be reduced to the free-flow level (n0), 
and congestion is now reduced to zero. 
 
                                                          
14 Data was purchased from the Transport Data Centre (within the New South Wales Department of 
Transport). 
15 The ‘potential’ speed is defined as the ‘maximum achievable’ speed at any level of traffic density. This 
is to eliminate the ‘interior’ observations (where the actual speed is less than this potential speed due to a 
whole host of other reasons such as weather condition, traffic accident on the road, individual driver’s 
habit, etc.) and therefore, to retain only the ‘boundary’ or frontier points which defines the unique 
relationship of equation (27). 
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Figure 1. Speed versus Traffic Density on Freeway 
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Figure 2. Congestion Index versus Traffic Density on Freeway 
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7. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have set out to explore the role of public infrastructure investment in 
private sector productivity by constructing a model of private sector activity using 
public infrastructure as a kind of congested public good input. The paper establishes the 
conditions under which optimal provision of public infrastructure can be said to have 
been reached. This is when each individual user pays an ‘effective’ (but unobserved) 
price for the use of a public infrastructure ‘capital’ which is just sufficient to cover its 
marginal productivity, and the aggregate of all these effective charges is also equal to 
the supply cost of the infrastructure. When this condition is satisfied, ‘congestion’ then 
acts as a kind of implicit tax which regulates each individual user’s behaviour to such an 
extent that the value of this ‘tax’ gives us an indication of how much individuals are 
prepared to pay to reduce congestion. We then use the measure of the congestion to 
define an optimal congestion tax index defined in terms of traffic density level rather 
than in terms of traffic flow level as was the case in the traditional analysis. When 
defined this way, the optimal congestion is seen to be more ‘robust’ and can be applied 
to both a ‘short run’ situation where traffic congestion has not reached a ‘hyper-
congestion’ level, In contrast, and a ‘long run’ situation when congestion has reached a 
‘bottleneck’ level which calls for investment in extra capacity rather than just demand 
regulation. Although the empirical example we used in this paper illustrates only a 
‘short run’ situation of ‘low congestion’, the model can also be applied to a ‘hyper-
congestion’ situation if more appropriate data is available in the future. 
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